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Abstract
A common way to understand memory structures in the cognitive sciences is as a 
cognitive map. Cognitive maps are representational systems organized by dimensions 
shared with physical space. The appeal to these maps begins literally: as an account of 
how spatial information is represented and used to inform spatial navigation. 
Invocations of cognitive maps, however, are often more ambitious;  cognitive maps are 
meant to scale up and provide the basis for our more sophisticated memory capacities. 
The extension is not meant to be metaphorical, but the way in which these richer 
mental structures are supposed to remain map-like  is rarely made explicit. Here we 
investigate this missing link, asking How do cognitive maps represent non-spatial 
information? We begin with a survey of  foundational work on  spatial cognitive maps 
and then provide a comparative review of alternative, non-spatial representational 
structures. We then turn to several cutting-edge projects that are engaged in the task of
scaling up cognitive maps so as to accommodate non-spatial information:  first, on the 
spatial-isometric approach, encoding content that is non-spatial but in some sense 
isomorphic to spatial content; second, on the abstraction approach, encoding content 
that is an abstraction over first-order spatial information; and third, on the embedding 
approach, embedding non-spatial information within a spatial context, a prominent 
example being the Method-of-Loci. Putting these cases alongside one another reveals the
variety of options available for building cognitive maps, and the distinctive limitations 
of each. We conclude by reflecting on where these results take us in terms of 
understanding the place of cognitive maps in memory. 
1 Both authors contributed equally
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1. Introduction
Over the course of any given day, we are exposed to vast amounts of 
information, and yet our memory systems are capable of encoding and later retrieving 
this information. This would be difficult, if not impossible, unless the stored information
were structured - that is, organized across various dimensions such as space, time, and 
semantic content. The use of structure to facilitate effective retrieval can be thought of 
as a general mnemonic strategy, both in terms of the subpersonal processes that 
organize the memory system and in terms of the personal-level strategies that we can 
use to intentionally facilitate recall of particular pieces of information (Aronowitz, 
2018). Cognitive scientists interested in memory have thus long been focused on 
investigations of memory structure. How do we organize information and experiences so 
as to make subsequent retrieval possible? 
A common way to conceptualize memory structures in the cognitive sciences is as
a cognitive map. Cognitive maps, in the most literal sense, are mental representations 
which are structured in a way that reflects the features of real space and which aid in 
navigation. Grounding the structure of memory systems in this basic and general ability
that is conserved across a wide range of species has obvious appeal. Cognitive maps thus
offer hope of theoretical and interspecies unity, as well as the opportunity to learn more 
about the structure of human memory by investigating the neural systems and behavior
of model organisms like rats and mice, where more extensive and precise interventions 
are available. 
Cognitive maps also present a puzzle. The appeal to these maps begins literally: 
as an account of  how spatial information is represented. Their intended use, however, is
more ambitious; cognitive maps are meant to scale up and provide the basis for our 
more sophisticated memory capacities (e.g., Bellmund 2018). Our memory systems, as 
well as those of animals, surely represent a variety of non-spatial information. And at 
least in us, some of this information is richly conceptual and linguistic. The extension is 
not meant to be metaphorical, but the sense in which these richer mental structures are 
supposed to remain map-like is rarely made explicit. How precisely is this process of 
scaling up meant to go? How do cognitive maps represent non-spatial information? 
There are a range of ways that generalization and abstraction could occur, each of 
which comes with a unique set of empirical consequences and a distinct view of mental 
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representation and memory structure. Each, too, comes with a set of particular concerns
and challenges. Our aim in this chapter is not to defend any particular view, but instead
to provide a framework for exploring the available options. 
This project is important for the neuroscience of memory because clarifying what 
cognitive maps represent and why has consequences for the methodology of identifying 
cognitive maps, the relationship between kinds of information in memory, and the 
relationship between memory and other forms of cognition. From a philosophical 
perspective, thinking carefully about cognitive maps is a window into understanding the
nature of mental representation in memory and cognition more broadly.  It would be an
understatement to say that the nature of perceptual representations has attracted 
serious philosophical interest -- and yet, the corresponding question in the philosophy of 
memory remains understudied.  We also hope that this chapter can shed light on a 
debate about map-like forms of representation more generally (e.g. Camp 2007, 2018; 
Rescorla 2009).
A few caveats: the aim of this chapter is to understand what cognitive maps are 
and how they are incorporated into memory research. As such, we will not start by 
defining a cognitive map. Instead, we’ll consider empirical work that appeals to this 
concept, taking note of definitions given by others along the way, attempting to derive a
working definition that fits at least the majority of this research. We do not intend our 
review of this empirical work to be exhaustive. When determining what to include, our 
primary focus is on the views of cognitive maps that have been developed into accounts 
of memory structure. We recognize, but do not discuss, the extensive literature on 
cognitive maps as competing models of spatial navigation and representation in animal 
cognition (see Bermudez 1998 and Rescorla 2017 for reviews). 
We begin, in Section 2, with a survey of two traditions: first, foundational work 
on cognitive maps that assumes these maps represent information in a spatial structure.
Second, a review of alternative, non-spatial representational structures. From the 
former, we identify a set of themes widely shared by proponents of cognitive maps. 
From the latter, we extract general lessons for accounts of cognitive structure. With this
background, in Section 3, we turn to several cutting-edge projects that are engaged in 
the task of scaling up cognitive maps so as to accommodate  non-spatial information. 
These projects each do so in interestingly different ways. Some kinds of spatial 
information may also be represented in a map-like form because they are organized 
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along dimensions that are substantially analogous to spatial information. In other cases, 
non-spatial information is represented as an abstraction from spatial information. And 
still other cognitive maps embed non-spatial information in a spatial structure. Putting 
these cases alongside one another reveals the variety of options available for building 
cognitive maps, and the distinctive limitations of each. We conclude by reflecting on 
where these results take us in terms of understanding the place of cognitive maps in 
memory. 
2. Foundational Work on Cognitive Structures 
A. Cognitive Maps as Spatial Structures 
Thinking of cognitive structures in terms of cognitive maps has a long history in 
psychology and neuroscience. The view began as an explanation of maze running 
abilities in rats and, over time, has developed and changed as it has been used to 
capture a range of activities, from semantic knowledge structures to the navigational 
expertise of London taxi drivers (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Maguire, Frackowiak, & Frith, 
1997). Throughout, theorists have aimed to make connections between these abilities in 
experimental animals and humans, but have offered subtly different accounts of why 
these maps exist, what’s essential to their structure, and how the extension from basic 
neural structure to broader human competences is characterized. 
Tolman (1948) is often identified as originating the idea of a cognitive map in 
this literature (although O’Keefe and Nadel also find historical inspiration in the work 
of Gulliver (1908)). Tolman’s account of the cognitive map emerged from his work on 
maze running and spatial learning in rats - the dominant method and experimental 
framework in early 20th century psychology. For Tolman, cognitive maps were part of 
an argument that explaining the navigational abilities of rats required more cognitive, 
representational structure than was allowed for by the stimulus-response approach, 
which was dominant at the time. Specifically, Tolman documented rats’ ability to learn 
shortcuts in mazes -- an ability inexplicable in terms of the animal’s learned association 
with particular places in the maze as individual stimuli. Tolman further observed that 
rats were capable of latent or non-reinforced learning. That is, rats that were simply 
allowed to explore mazes while fully fed --  not receiving nor wanting any reinforcement 
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for their exploration -- were able to learn routes through the maze. In order to explain 
this behavior, Tolman argued, the rat needed to be credited with the possession of a 
cognitive map that provided a “field map of the environment” (1948: p. 192). Although 
Tolman’s evidence was based in the maze running behavior of rats, he intended the 
notion of cognitive map appealed to in explaining this behavior to be applicable to a 
much wider range of cognitive creatures.  Indeed, his 1948 paper was titled “Cognitive 
Maps in Rats and Men.” The paper even concludes with a few pages of speculation on 
how particular features of human personality and social organization may be explicable 
within this framework. 
Tolman’s  initial proposal was solidified into a theory of neural structure with the
publication of O’Keefe and Nadel’s Hippocampus as a Cognitive Map (1978). For 
O’Keefe & Nadel, cognitive maps were not simply a general framework for thinking 
about mental structure; the cognitive map was posed as a theory of hippocampal 
function. It was the first such proposal, and a highly systematic one, which helps to 
explain both the initial excitement about the idea and its lasting influence. There are 
further differences between Tolman’s use of the term and use in O’Keefe and Nadel’s 
framework, which serves as the basis of “Cognitive Map Theory” as its now understood.
First, O’Keefe and Nadel take the notion of a map far more literally than Tolman. The 
claim is not that the information-processing of the hippocampus can be understood as 
map-like or spatial-ish, but that these cognitive maps are inherently spatial. In putting 
forward their theory, they make continued, explicit appeal to the Kantian idea of spatial
structures as an organizing feature of cognition. These spatial maps are considered 
innate structures endemic to all cognitive creatures. Second, the extension of these maps
to humans is not a metaphorical abstraction from the idea of a spatial map, but is 
instead characterized as an expansion of the kind of inputs that the spatial system can 
incorporate and process. This is best illustrated by their account of cognitive maps in 
humans: “the left hippocampus in humans functions in semantic mapping, while the 
right hippocampus retains the spatial mapping function seen in infra-humans. On this 
view, species differences in hippocampal function reflect changes in the inputs to the 
mapping system, rather than major changes in its mode of operation” (1978: p. 3). 
 The centerpiece of cognitive map theory is the discovery of place cells (O’Keefe 
& Dostrovsky, 1971): neurons in the hippocampus that fire preferentially—exhibiting a 
burst of action potentials—in response to a specific location in the organism's 
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environment. When a rat navigates a maze, for example, some place cells fire at the 
beginning of the maze, others at the first fork, still others at the second fork, and so on. 
These place cells are organized topographically, so that their collective firing pattern 
reflects the rat's route. After the maze has been run, the pattern is rehearsed, 
establishing a “map” that allows the rat to navigate this environment more easily the 
next time it is encountered.  
The discovery of grid cells further enriches our understanding of the maps 
created by the hippocampal system (Hafting et al., 2005). Grid cells are found in the 
medial entorhinal cortex and, in contrast to hippocampal place cells, fire at multiple 
regularly-spaced locations in the environment. Seen over the rat’s trajectory, the spatial 
firing patterns of these cells provide a grid-like representation of the organism’s 
environment. Other cells select for additional elements of the map - e.g., cells that track
objects, landmarks, and other agents (Hoydal et al 2018), head direction cells that fire 
selectively based on the way the organism’s head is oriented relative to its route (Taube,
Muller, & Rank 1990), and those that encode information about the distance to borders 
and edges (Solstad et al, 2008). 
In our brief survey of this work, we want to highlight two important features of 
this literature as we see it. First, even though work on cognitive maps and memory 
structure has been done mostly with rats and mice and has focused on low-level neural 
structure, the intent beyond this idea has always been to make claims about the role of 
such maps in cognitive creatures more general. That is, the aim was not simply to move
away from overly simplistic stimulus-response models of non-human animal learning, 
but to think about the cognitive structures available to these non-human animals in 
terms of a framework that would encompass cognitive processes and cognitive creatures 
more generally. How the cross-species and beyond-spatial generalizations of the 
framework are envisioned differs across particular accounts and interpretations of 
cognitive maps. 
Second, Cognitive Map Theory remains influential and controversial. The 
framework continues to serve as a serious guide to inquiry into neural structure, 
especially with regards to the hippocampus (Bellmund et al. 2018. The view also serves 
as a steady target for alternative conceptions of neural structure and cognitive 
processing. Many of these criticisms involve claims and/or evidence that the information
represented in these “maps” is non-spatial. That such interpretations of the content of 
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cognitive maps are available is certain. Whether this sense of cognitive maps is an 
extension of the original framework or an objection to it is more contentious. Answering
this question depends on asking, first, how the notion of “map” should be understood. 
We address this in Section 3. 
B. Non-Spatial Cognitive Structures
Cognitive psychology has, since its beginnings, been interested in how humans 
and other cognitive creatures organize their vast amounts of knowledge so as to support 
efficient and effective search and retrieval. Although some of these cognitive structures 
are referred to as “maps,” in such cases the term is being stretched to non-standard or 
metaphorical use. In this section, we’ll survey some of the foundational work on 
structures in cognitive science that do not seem to be map-like and do not primarily 
encode spatial content.  
We’ll start with  emergent conceptual structures. These are ways of organizing 
and relating information that emerge from amassing overlapping conceptual content, 
and acquire their particular structures from patterns in the accumulated information.  
For example, this type of memory structure is often thought to support language 
comprehension and production. Adele Goldberg (2018) presents a view of language 
intended to explain the differences between the following kinds of minimal pair:
1) I’ll cry myself to sleep
2) I’ll cry myself asleep  (p57)
The former sentence is perfectly felicitous, whereas native speakers judge the latter to 
be odd. Perhaps (2) is odd because it is novel or unusual, but as Goldberg notes, we are 
perfectly happy with unusual sentences like this:
3) She’d smiled herself an upgrade (p76)
Goldberg explains what’s special about (2) by appealing to the role of long-term 
memory organization. On her account, we encode much of the language we hear in a 
high-dimensional conceptual space that is structured by syntactic form, meaning (in 
context), phonetic features, and so on. Since there are systematic relationships between 
many of these features, over time clusters emerge. Bits of language that are encountered
more frequently are selectively strengthened, whereas the connection between a word or 
phrase and its initial context is weakened if it then fails to occur in similar contexts. We
have only noisy, implicit access to this space. Thus, the problem with (2) is that it is 
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close to a stronger competitor, (1). Conversely, (3), while unusual, does not trigger us to
recall a more common alternative formulation, and so we judge it to be felicitous. 
This example helps us extract several key features of an emergent conceptual 
structure. Over time, in the case of language, certain features of language stand out as 
principal components: for instance, in English, sentences with the form of the double-
object construction (e.g. she (x) passed him (y) something (z)) almost always have the 
meaning that x causes y to receive z. This is a regularity that relates sentential form to 
semantic content, and crucially, Goldberg argues that this regularity arises in memory 
without any need to learn an explicit rule or start off with innate knowledge. Instead, 
the emergent conceptual structure allows for all kinds of regularities between a wide 
variety of features to be learned over sufficient exposure. Such a structure must 
therefore be (a) highly dimensional, in order to catch the relevant features, (b) 
associative, in order to flexibly relate these features without a prior model, and (c) 
content-addressable, in order to utilize stored information to produce responses 
efficiently.   
A second kind of non-spatial structure is a graphical model, a family of models 
within which we’ll focus on Bayesian networks. In the case we just considered, the 
regularity between the double-object construction and the type of causal-agential 
content was represented as a clustering or association. We neither represent the 
syntactic structure as dependent on the semantic content nor vice-versa; the association 
is not specific enough to represent anything more than organization in terms of 
similarity. But in a Bayesian network, relationships between features are represented as 
a set of conditional (in)dependencies.  For example, I might encode information about 
academic lectures as in figure 1c. 
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[Figure 1: Conceptual Structures: 1a and 1b represent highly-dimensional spaces 
as described by Goldberg (2018) which combine semantic information with other 
dimensions such as syntax and phonetics with dark lines representing phrase frequency. 
We find “cried asleep” to be more awkward than “smiled herself an upgrade” because of
its nearness to a common alternative.  1c depicts a graphical model with nodes 
representing event features, and edges representing probabilistic dependencies. ]
In this model, the nodes are random variables and the edges represent 
dependencies (sets of local probability models). This allows us to assume that a node is 
independent of any other node, conditional on its parents: for instance, conditional on 
Conference Quality, Speaker Style is independent of Talk Content. Notice that in the 
above graph, an edge connects Conference Quality to Talk Content but it seems unlikely
that Conference Quality is a cause of Talk Content. A narrower class of these models, 
causal Bayesian networks, interprets dependence and independence causally; 
consequently, laws of causality can be applied to the graph structures, such as 
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transitivity, asymmetry, and non-reflexivity. As is, this graphical representation is 
completely equivalent to an enumeration of the local probability models; however, when
treated as a representation structure, the graphical representation can have properties 
not shared by the set of local models. For instance, we might search the graphical 
representation with an algorithm designed specifically for search in a graph, which 
would produce different behavior than search over other forms of representing the same 
information (e.g. Dechter and Mateescu, 2007).  Whether or not it is true that 
conceptual knowledge is in fact represented with, in addition to representable by,  
graphical models, this hypothesis provides an interesting model of non-spatial mental 
structures. 
Glymour (2001) analyzes a wide swath of human cognition in terms of causal 
Bayesian networks. These representations have three functions on his account: control, 
prediction, and discovery. To varying degrees, these functions could be fulfilled just as 
well no matter the format of the probabilistic and causal information. However, the 
graphical format is significant as soon as the thinker employing the models is not 
perfect. Graphical representations figure directly in heuristics and inductive biases, such 
as a preference for an explanation that appeals to fewer causes (Lombrozo, 2007).  
Graphical representations allow simple access to points of potential intervention 
(Gopnik et al, 2004). As we noted above, we can define distinctive algorithms for search
over graphical representations, and both noise and lesions to the model will operate 
differently depending on representational format.  
Thus our second class of non-spatial models, causal Bayesian networks, is used to
represent all kinds of causal knowledge. These representations function to identify 
interventions, predict new outcomes, and enumerate new possible theories.  Bayesian 
networks are well-suited to performing these functions because they  organize 
information according to principles (that is, the principles of causation) that (a) apply 
to the entire domain and (b) align with our interests in manipulating the environment. 
Emergent conceptual structures and causal Bayesian networks are both 
structures that have been posited as operant in memory. Neither of these structures is 
in any notable way spatial or especially suited for spatial information. Both of these 
structures are functional: they are thought to have certain features that map on to 
computational advantages for the thinkers who employ them.  Emergent conceptual 
structures are more flexible than causal Bayesian networks, since the latter can only 
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represent causal relationships whereas the former can represent non-causal associations. 
Correspondingly, causal Bayesian networks can express a more complex set of 
relationships within the causal domain, differentiating cause and effect, and identifying 
potentially complex causal patterns. Emergent conceptual structures represent many 
features in exactly one relationship: similarity.  
Considering these two structures leaves us with a few key take-aways. First, even
models of abstract, domain-bridging, and perhaps distinctively human knowledge, 
cognitive structures are still thought to be tailored to particular functions. Second, there
seems to be a trade-off between the generality of a representation (i.e. the kinds of 
features it could in principle represent) and its inferential power (i.e. the conclusions 
that can be derived from the connections among representational sub-units). When data
and processing limitations are held fixed, we could either utilize a structure with more 
flexible (and hence weak) connections, or with less flexible (but more powerful) 
connecting links. This idea is fairly intuitive, following from a more general connection 
between flexibility and informativeness. In the case of emergent conceptual structures, 
we saw an advantage of flexibility at work: Goldberg’s model allows speakers to track 
not just semantic or syntactic patterns separately, but to combine all the information 
we have about a string of language and thereby to learn patterns of association that 
cross-cut traditional linguistic categories. Causal Bayesian networks displayed one of the
advantages of inferential power: by representing causal structures in graphs, we made 
the task of determining points of intervention vastly easier. These cases offer helpful 
comparisons for considering how to manage these trade-offs in characterizing the 
functions of spatial structures that serve as the basis for cognitive maps. 
3. Cognitive Maps and Non-Spatial Information
The foregoing sections divided recent and historical work on memory structures 
into two categories: spatial (or spatially-grounded) cognitive maps and non-spatial 
cognitive structures. In this section, we’ll look at how the line between them can be 
blurred, such that cognitive maps might be used to encode less obviously spatial 
information. Specifically, we ask how minimal the spatial format can be while still 
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leaving us with a meaningful notion of a cognitive map as a particular kind of functional
memory structure. 
To do so, we require a more extensive understanding of the basic notion of a map
from which the idea of a cognitive map is generated. There is no canonical account of 
cartographic representation available, but we can provide a sketch by building off of a 
set of features proposed by Rescorla (2017). For Rescorla, maps 1) represent geometric 
aspects of physical space2, 2) have veridicality conditions, 3) have geometric structure, 
and 4) are veridical only if they replicate salient geometric aspects of the region being 
represented. Cognitive maps are then maps in a strict sense when they consist of mental
representations with these properties. 
However, the definition proposed by Rescorla will not capture crucial elements of 
the spatial maps we’ve already discussed, since his definition focuses solely on 
synchronic, intrinsic features3. The kind of cognitive maps we’ve surveyed are also used 
in navigation, and  interpreted and updated accordingly4.  This addition is crucial: a 
representation that has all the right internal properties but is never used in navigation 
is not really a map  -- and likewise with one that does not  even potentially keep step 
with changes of information about the environment. Combining this functional role with
Rescorla’s conditions also lets us derive a fairly distinctive feature of maps, both 
cognitive and otherwise: we often update a piece of a map, such as a representation of 
the rooms on my floor, without even assessing a possible re-mapping of global relations, 
such as the distance between my room and Samarkand. We’ll call this feature locality.   
When extending the notion of cognitive maps to non-spatial information, we 
relax the definition to capture a more general (or perhaps analogical) sense of map. 
Most directly, 1) will always be  false because the information being represented is not 
spatial. This will require, in turn, changes to  how the veridicality conditions in 4) are 
understood, and what navigation might mean. 
2 Dabaghian et al (2014) argue that hippocampal maps represent topological (i.e. ordinal) features of 
space rather than geometric properties such as absolute distances and angles. We suspect this 
difference with Rescorla is at least partly terminological. Thus we take (1) to be satisfied by the model 
proposed by Dabaghian et al. 
3 We can see several potential ways to derive updating behaviors from Rescorla’s conditions - however, 
the same cannot be done for navigation, since it’s clearly possible for a creature which does not behave 
at all, let alone navigate, to have a cognitive map on his definition. 
4 Camp (2007) focuses more on these dynamic factors - on her view, a map is a representational system 
with a semi-compositional structure that determines what we can infer, how maps can be assembled, and
how updating works. 
12
 In this section, we consider three ways of extending the cognitive map. Each 
involves a distinct way of modifying the first condition on cartographic representations -
i.e., what is being represented : first, encoding content that is non-spatial but in some 
sense isomorphic to spatial content; second, encoding content that is an abstraction over
first-order spatial information; and third, embedding non-spatial information within a 
spatial context.
Before we begin, a caveat. This section is interested in representations of non-
spatial information that are in some sense utilizing the map-like representations 
traditionally associated with space (for a description of these parameters see O’Keefe 
1991). This neither entails nor follows from a relationship between the neural-level 
realizers of spatial and non-spatial representations.  Howard Eichenbaum and associated
scholars have long tried to challenge the cognitive map picture by pointing to non-
spatial uses of neural resources thought to be part of cognitive maps (see also 
MacDonald et al, 2011; Aronov et al 2017; Wood et al., 1999). Thus this line of research
is not a case of extending the cognitive map to encompass non-spatial information, so 
long as the claim is about a shared neural substrate rather than a shared 
representational structure.
A. Spatial-isomorphic information
Spatial-isomorphic content is a kind of content that is structured according to 
dimensions that functionally correspond to spatial dimensions. By functional 
correspondence, we mean that the regularities, limitations, and inference patterns that 
we commonly apply to spatial dimensions will for the most part apply to these non-
spatial dimensions. For example, (Euclidian) spatial distance is symmetric -- if my office
is ten feet from the coffee machine, then the coffee machine is ten feet from my office5. 
Spatial-isomorphic content, since its dimensions functionally correspond to spatial 
dimensions, will tend to have a “distance-like” measure that is symmetric in the same 
way. It seems reasonable that, were we to have a dedicated cognitive mapping system 
for dealing with spatial content, this system might also be used for dealing with spatial-
isomorphic content.
5 Interestingly, path representations are not always symmetric - see Kuipers (1982) for a theoretical 
computer science perspective on how this asymmetry interacts with the “map” metaphor.
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Constantinescu et al. (2016) offer some preliminary evidence that some of the 
core processes for representing spatial maps can be used for spatial-isomorphic content.  
Unlike related work on spatial representations of non-spatial information (e.g. Tavares 
et al. 2015), the authors went beyond neurally co-locating spatial and non-spatial 
activity.  Instead, they focused on a signature of spatial representation: coding of a 
space into a hexagonal lattice, such that the rate of cell firing corresponds to the 
orientation of movement relative to the orientation of the lattice. Because strongest 
firing occurs at 60 degree increments in orientation, the 360 degrees of phase space are 
divided into six identical regions, giving rise to the lattice’s hexagonal symmetry6. The 
authors looked for this hexagonal symmetry as a mark of what are sometimes called 
“human grid cells”.  Unlike the grid cells discussed in Section 2a, these neurons are not 
thought to be restricted to regions of the medial temporal lobe but instead are thought 
to occur throughout (some of) the brain regions that also form the Default Mode 
Network, including ventromedial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortex.  Still, 
previous work has associated these more distributed cells with spatial representations 
(e.g. Doeller et al, 2010). Rather than a strictly spatial task, Constantinescu et al. 
taught participants a pattern of association between the appearance of a bird and a set 
of symbolic cues. The bird figure varied according to neck height and leg lengths, which 
allowed for a representation of possible bird figures in a two-dimensional space 
structured by these two features. The bird-cue relationships were chosen so that each 
cue picked out a single region of this “bird space”. The authors indeed found 
hexagonally symmetric responses (measured in fMRI) in a variety of Default Mode brain
regions that seemed to correspond to hexagonal, grid-like representations of “bird 
space”.  
The bird space used in this study was spatial-isomorphic, since it was structured 
according to two dimensions (neck height, and leg length) that could be used to carve 
up a feature space with several space-like functional dimensions: it was a two-
dimensional Euclidean space, with distance and orientation operating just as they would
in a real space. Intuitively, the bird space is space-like in that it articulates a 
“conceptual space”, but also space-like in that neck height and leg length are themselves
literally spatial dimensions. However, the design of this study allows Constantinescu et 
6 However, recent work in rodents (e.g. Stensola et al. 2015) has found a variety of cases where 
hexagonal symmetry in grid cells is distorted.  
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al. to differentiate between these two spatial aspects of the stimulus: because the “bird 
space” and the bird’s features in regular space are two distinct spaces, moving through 
each would produce different patterns of symmetrical activation. Since the stimuli were 
carefully chosen to avoid passing through phase space in the same way, the observed 
symmetries in fMRI signal should not reflect the bird’s position in visual space. 
The use of hexagonal coding itself, if the authors are correct, suggests a second 
kind of isomorphism. Hexagonal coding is thought to be optimal for spatial 
representation in particular; Mathis et al. (2015), for example, present an optimal model
that ranks hexagonal coding highest for spatial resolution in the two-dimensional plane. 
In ordinary space, we don’t normally privilege one dimension over another: that is, the 
north-south axis is not in general more informative than the east-west axis. This allows 
us to value spatial resolution uniformly across the plane. But we do typically privilege 
those two axes over the up-down axis in navigation. These two features must be 
assumed in order to show the hexagonal lattice is optimal in the spatial domain. Neither
feature needs to obtain in conceptual space. For instance, resolution in the bird-neck-
height dimension may be more valuable than information in the bird-leg-length 
dimension. Were this to be true, the hexagonal symmetries observed by Constantinescu 
et al. would reflect a sub-optimal representation. And so we can conclude that the use of
a hexagonal symmetry code either reflects (i) a genuine isomorphism between the 
conceptual space and real space, or (ii) a representational choice that favors spatial-
isomorphism over customization to the optimal division of conceptual space. 
Another kind of spatial isomorphism centers around temporal rather than 
conceptual structure. Researchers commonly motivate the division of a temporal 
sequence into parts by analogy with the division of a spatial layout into parts. For 
instance, Zacks and Swallow (2007) write: “For quite a while, psychologists have known 
that in order to recognize or understand an object people often segment it into its 
spatial parts (e.g., Biederman, 1987). A new body of research has shown that just as 
segmenting in space is important for understanding objects, segmenting in time is 
important for understanding events.” This literature on event segmentation asks how 
and why we draw boundaries between events. While Zacks and Swallow take the 
process of segmentation to be somewhat automatic, DuBrow et al. (2017) present 
contrasting evidence suggesting that segmentation can be active, abrupt, and driven by 
top-down goals. 
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Is this use of space merely a helpful metaphor, or is event structure genuinely 
spatial-isomorphic? One genuine isomorphism comes from the local structure of both 
representations. That is, a ubiquitous feature of cognitive maps is their locality. While I 
have a clear idea of how things in my apartment complex are oriented, and a good idea 
of how things in the Philadelphia Museum of Art are oriented, I do not necessarily have
a joint map that neatly connects the two. Kuipers (1982;2007) views this as a key 
starting assumption of cognitive maps even in machines: breaking a map into smaller, 
local maps allows the agent to remain non-committal about global connections. This 
locality of representation seems to hold for temporal segmentation as well. Upon hearing
a story, I might build a temporal “map” of the events of my friend’s adventure last 
week without forming any particular representation of how the details of the events she 
is describing fit into a temporal sequence of my own schedule last week. Locality 
naturally arises from the use of schemas; Baldassano et al. (2018) found that temporal 
boundaries in event schemas across different kinds of events had a common neural 
signature, provided they shared an abstract schematic structure. That is, schematic 
representations impose a local structure relative to the device of the schema itself (e.g. 
from when you enter a restaurant to when you pay the check). Anchoring event 
segmentation in local (temporal) structure, then, creates an abstract isomorphism with 
spatial maps, which are anchored in local (spatial) structures.  
We could point to a long tradition locating isomorphisms between space and 
time, tracing at least back to Kant (1781/1787, A33/B49-50). The strength of this 
tradition, however, is a double-edged sword; the abundance of spatial language used in 
our everyday talk about time makes it hard to genuinely conceive of the capacity to 
represent space and the capacity to represent time as distinct. The question of 
isomorphism between space and time may, from this perspective, be ill-formed if the 
two capacities are more than accidentally linked to one another. 
In summary, one way to extend the core notion of a cognitive map to non-spatial
information is to treat the non-spatial information as spatial-isomorphic. These 
expansions are most efficient in cases where the non-spatial domain has significant 
regularities that mirror regularities that compose our representations of space, such as a 
symmetrical distance measure, roughly equal value assigned to discriminability among 
the dimensions on a two-dimensional plane, and a representation of related “spaces” 
that can be composed locally and independently. 
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B. Abstractions over spatial information 
Another way to extend cognitive map theory - integrating work on neural-level 
spatial maps and cognitive-level structure - is to explore ways in which the neural 
systems that support cognitive maps can process and represent abstractions from spatial
information. Here we consider two kinds of spatial abstraction: first, a structure where 
the abstraction itself is still isomorphic to the lower-order representation of space, and 
second, abstractions over space that are no longer spatial-isomorphic.
Michael Hasselmo (2011) has used cognitive map theory - with its place, grid, 
and head direction cells - to build a map-based account of episodic memory. In keeping 
with key themes of cognitive map theory, Hasselmo’s theory is derived largely from 
work with rats, but is meant to provide an account of episodic memory that can scale to
humans. His book-length articulation of the view is entitled How We Remember and the
“we” here encompasses all mammals with similar hippocampal structure. Critical to 
Hasselmo’s particular version of cognitive map theory is the idea that the hippocampus 
(and surrounding structures) are a phase coding mechanism, where the map-making 
activity of place and grid cells is integrated into maps of the environment at multiple 
spatial and temporal scales. That is, the hippocampus produces a series of cognitive 
maps, in Rescorla’s (2009) loose sense, representing the environment in more or less 
detail, as a function of the scale imposed by the cells from which they are activated. 
Together, these maps represent a particular event or experience, serving as the content 
of an episodic memory. To support the idea of multiple maps, Hasselmo incorporates 
neurons from the entire hippocampus into his model, rather than focusing primarily on 
the dorsal portions of the hippocampus as is common in much of the literature.  
Hasselmo argues that neurons across the hippocampus share the mapping 
function; the differences between dorsal and ventral neurons is a matter of the size of 
their receptive fields, not their general function. As one moves across the hippocampus, 
from dorsal to ventral, the receptive field size of the neurons increases. This increase in 
receptive field size results in a comparable increase in the scalar proportion of the map. 
Maps featuring place cells with the smallest receptive fields represent the organism's 
immediate surroundings in detail, whereas larger maps are produced by place cells with 
larger receptive fields, situating the experience within its (increasingly broad) spatial 
and temporal context. Importantly, the broadest ‘maps’ may remain spatial in only the 
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loosest or most metaphorical sense, situating the event within a social, conceptual, or 
experiential context.  
The result is a mechanism that produces representations rich enough to support 
episodic remembering. The existence of multiple maps allows for a single episode to be 
recorded at several “scales of experience” (Hasselmo, 2008), capturing the episode as 
occurring not only at a particular place and time but as associated with various objects 
and events. For example, consider my episodic memory of walking from my campus 
office to the University library to return a library book this morning. On Hasselmo’s 
view, the representation of this episode is a conjoined set of maps of the event at 
different scales of experience. We can think of the smallest-scale map of the event in 
terms of traditional cognitive map approaches - as an allocentric map of the campus, 
along with my route from my office to the library. But other maps associated with this 
episode will represent this event at different spatial, temporal, and contextual scales. 
The more abstract spatial maps may represent campus with relation to the part of 
town, city, state or continent in which I live. More abstract temporal maps will 
represent my route through this map as part of my schedule for the day, or schedule for
the week, or activities characteristic of this time in the academic year. Further 
contextual maps will also be available, where the items represented in the map situate 
the landmarks along the route on different contextual scales - e.g., this trip to the 
library as a stage in a particular research project; trees along this route at this time of 
the year; campus construction at this time, etc. 
Hasselmo’s model proposes that the cognitive map system can process 
increasingly abstract characterizations of space and time that can then serve as the 
content for more elaborate and higher-order episodic memories. However, his 
hierarchical picture would seem to preserve some degree of structural similarity between
levels. On the other hand, Behrens and colleagues (2018) also provide an account of 
abstraction from first-order spatial information, in the form of eigenvectors 
corresponding to transformations between first-order spatial (and non-spatial) 
environments. Unlike a hierarchical, nested representation of experience, an eigenvector 
is an abstraction that does not share a structure with its first-order counterparts. 
Eigenvectors fall into a broader class discussed by Behrens et al. (2018) including 
inductive biases and factorizations -- these are all features applying to a set of 
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environments or state spaces that aid in learning, but seem to require additional 
representational resources.    
The authors argue for a common set of abstractive capacities operating over both
spatial and non-spatial representation, which would utilize higher-order features to drive
first-order prediction and planning. Presumably, whatever representational resources 
would be needed to supplement first-order maps with these higher-order features must 
be integrated tightly with the first-order maps themselves -- Behrens et al. provide a few
suggestions, but how this integration might work is still very much an open question. 
C. Embedding non-spatial information in a spatial format     
A third way to expand spatial representations would be to keep the spatial 
structure intact and embed non-spatial information within that structure. The most 
prominent example of memory success, the Method-of-Loci (MoL), can be understood as
organizing information in this way. In the MoL, subjects typically memorize a list of 
unstructured items such as random words or phone numbers by imagining these items 
in a structured environment such as a familiar childhood walk through the 
neighborhood. The MoL thus appears to be a way of using a useful feature of spatial 
memory to store non-spatial content. The explicit process in the MoL involves two 
stages: a strategy for encoding items through visualization, and a strategy for retrieving 
items through a parallel visualization. For example, I would encode a list by imagining a
walk through my childhood home, and then later recall the items by imagining walking 
through the home again and picking up the items. 
Questions about how and why mnemonic structure works have received very 
little attention from memory theorists and scientists. The scant evidence that exists is, 
however, suggestive and intriguing and invites us to ask more detailed questions about 
memory structure. Both the testimony of memory champions and some preliminary 
studies of expert performance reveal that success in the use of mnemonics does not 
require any particular level of intelligence or distinct cognitive skills. Instead, the key to
success using mnemonic techniques is simply practice (Ericsson, 2003; Wilding & 
Valentine, 1997). These behavioral reports are complemented by neuroimaging studies 
indicating that those who use these techniques regularly differ from controls in 
functional, but not structural brain features (Maguire et al., 2003; Raz et al., 2009). A 
recent and intriguing paper showed that, after only 6 weeks of training, cognitively 
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matched novices exhibited the same functional changes seen in memory champions 
(Dresler et al., 2017).  Similarly, Yoon and colleagues (2018) have just shown that a 
person trained to increase their digit span to over 100 digits thirty years ago has 
retained many of the associated skills despite undertaking no training in the meantime.
In the majority of these cases, the items to be memorized do not have an 
interesting non-spatial structure themselves (e.g., digit span, presentation order of a 
shuffled deck of cards). However, looking more closely at the history of this mnemonic 
technique reveals that it has also been used for semantically structured information. In 
De Oratore, Cicero recommended the technique for memorizing speeches, lyric poems, 
and the like. The Classicist Minchin (2001) argued that Homer used this method to 
compose and perform the Iliad and Odyssey. In the Middle Ages, it was common for 
monks to use this technique to memorize the Bible’s 150 Psalms, as well as long 
passages from other scholarly texts (Carruthers 2008). This is continued in some forms 
of contemporary use, as when students use such techniques to help them remember 
conceptually blocks of information (Kerr & Neisser, 1983; Roediger, 1980; Wang & 
Thomas, 2000). The ability to achieve additional mnemonic gains by translating 
information that is already semantically or conceptually structured into a spatial format
suggests that there is something about spatial structure in particular that is useful for 
memory retrieval.
  
We have surveyed three ways in which spatial maps might be “scaled up” to 
accommodate non-spatial information. First, spatial structures might be re-purposed to 
represent non-spatial content with a suitably isomorphic structure: for instance, a  
conceptual “space” can be modeled as a two-dimensional Euclidean plane. Second, 
spatial structures might be used to represent abstractions over spatial information, 
whether in the form of higher-order but still spatially structured representations, or with
summary statistics that are to some degree represented jointly with traditional maps. 
Third, non-spatial information might be embedded in a spatial map, overriding or 
supplementing non-spatial structure with an exogenous spatial structure. 
Taking stock of these results in light of the two traditions discussed in Section 2, 
we can draw two key conclusions. First, following on Tolman’s original essay, the idea of
seeing how far the basic components of the cognitive map can be stretched to fit non-
spatial content is still very much an open research question. Second, the trade-off 
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between flexibility and inferential power that we observed in the case of conceptual 
representations characterizes the question of expanding the cognitive map as well. The 
more we stretch the notion, the more we reduce inferential power in favor of flexibility. 
4. Why extend the cognitive map?
 
The work that we have surveyed in this essay testifies to a persistent interest in 
understanding the edges of applicability of the concept of a cognitive map. Given the 
difficulties of extending the cognitive map concept to non-spatial information, why are 
researchers pursuing this program? What benefits come from thinking about the 
structure of mental representations within this framework?
One reason to see how far the cognitive map concept stretches ties cognitive 
functions to evolutionary history. Neuroscientists have long argued for functional and 
anatomical homologies across a broad range of mammalian species (e.g., Clark & Squire,
2013, but see also Zhao 2018). As a theory of hippocampal function, cognitive maps 
offer the potential for an explanation of navigational and cognitive systems across all 
species in which these basic anatomical structures are preserved. A cognitive map, in 
the core spatial context, links a somewhat general capacity for long-term spatial 
memory to a more obviously adaptive capacity for spatial navigation. Likewise, a model 
on which some kinds of conceptual memory utilize a cognitive map provides a potential 
basis for understanding the evolution of conceptual memory. Viewed from this 
perspective, the cognitive map project embodies an explanatory aim: not just to have 
accurate models of mental faculties, but to find models that explain how a creature with
our lineage could have developed these faculties. Under this aim, the three types of 
extension we discussed have divergent implications. Spatial-isomorphic extension is a 
way of re-using structures that were tailored for a particular spatial purpose for new 
tasks that happen to have similar structure. Extension by abstraction, on the other 
hand, is a richer ability applied to the very same core domain. In comparison with these
two, embedding non-spatial content in space appears more like a culturally developed 
trick that makes clever use of evolutionarily adapted structures. In short, there is a 
story to tell for each way the cognitive map could have become extended, but there are 
important differences in how this story goes in each case. 
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Another reason to persist with cognitive maps may be a general commitment to 
parsimony across cognitive systems. An enriched and extended notion of cognitive maps
could provide the representational basis for a broad range of cognitive processes - 
providing a competitor to the logically structured language of thought, as developed 
primarily by Fodor (1975, 1987) and Pylyshyn (1984)(see Rescorla 2009 for such a 
proposal). The more forms of memory, and cognition more broadly, that can be 
understood from within this basic framework, the more streamlined and unified our 
understanding of cognitive systems becomes. This idea of parsimony as part of the 
explanatory aim in understanding the mind is notably different from a concern with 
parsimony within the mind as a matter of representational efficiency, though both might
motivate an interest in conserving structures across cognitive domains. 
As we noted in Section 2b, however, parsimony has consequences for the tradeoff 
between flexibility and informativeness. That is, the more cognitive subsystems employ 
the same structures, the more flexibly (and thereby less informative) the structures 
must be. Again, much depends on which form of generalizing to the non-spatial we 
adopt. Under spatial-isomorphic extension, there is a genuine form of parsimony in 
applying similar structures to isomorphic domains. But the utility of this approach will 
be limited to the number of domains that share these structures. There is little reason 
to hope or expect that all domains will be spatial-isomorphic in the requisite ways. The 
same argument might be harder to leverage for the other two kinds of extension. The 
discussion of the Hasselmo and Behrens et al. models revealed that abstractions of 
spatial information might be spatial-isomorphic, but need not be. Embedding non-
spatial information in maps likewise would not be predicted by the idea that related 
functions should in general utilize related structures. Instead, to motivate embeddings of
this kind, we’d need a much stronger notion of parsimony: for example, that an 
explanation with fewer structures should be preferred even when it explains across 
distinct functions. This stronger form of parsimony would of course undermine the 
previous rationale, under which we prefer a one-to-one fit of structure to function, since 
it encodes a preference for a one-to-many fit. 
In the cognitive science tradition, memory has long served as one of the best 
candidates for inter-level integration. It is often, literally, the textbook model of how the
various cognitive sciences can all contribute to a shared understanding of a particular 
cognitive process (e.g., Bermudez, 2014). Similarly, philosophers of neuroscience use 
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memory as a case study in mechanistic levels of explanation (Craver, 2007). The appeal 
of cognitive map theory can be understood as a commitment to this aspirational model. 
The origins of cognitive map theory reflect this - O’Keefe and Nadel were inspired by 
the relatively simultaneous discovery of place cells, LTP and other cellular and 
molecular processes in the hippocampus and the observation of the patient H.M.’s loss 
of episodic memory in response to hippocampal damage during neurosurgery. The 
promise of inter-level integration relies on a shared understanding of the cognitive 
process at each of the cascading levels in the model. Each version of cognitive map 
theory’s extension offers a different account of the system whose levels of understanding 
and inquiry are being integrated. On the spatial-isomorphic interpretation of the 
extension, the system is one for representing regular and symmetric structures, spatial 
or otherwise. On the abstraction approach, spatial navigation is the core cognitive 
function or ability of this inter-level system. On the embedding approach, it’s 
declarative remembering that is central to the inter-level project. In short, inter-level 
integration in cognitive science requires an understanding of the cognitive 
ability/system/function of interest, from which the process of decomposition and 
unification of distinct methodological approaches can begin. Such integration may be 
possible on each of these three forms of cognitive map theory, but they will each offer a 
distinct account of the cognitive ability being integrated. 
These three reasons why one might be interested in expanding the cognitive map 
to non-spatial domains thus push us in different directions when it comes to how to 
extend the map. But beyond that, they also reveal a puzzle inherent in locating the 
cognitive map in memory. That is, to what extent is this information structure a proper
part of memory? Given that alternative, non-spatial cognitive structures - like those 
explored in Section 2b - can also be understood as accounts of memory structure, the 
need to defend the reliance on cognitive maps, however extended, becomes more critical.
5. Conclusion 
What is a “cognitive map”? This concept is pervasive but hard to define 
comprehensively: at its core, a cognitive map represents the environment by taking 
advantage of the structure of space. As a metaphor, it offers a way of unifying our 
understanding of the representational structures endemic to cognition, giving a sense of 
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shared function across a range of species and abilities. Insofar as cognitive maps remain 
an active research program, more attention should be devoted to the conceptual space 
between the literal and metaphorical versions.  
The concept of a cognitive map is deeply intertwined with contemporary research
on memory. In this chapter, we’ve surveyed a series of recent attempts to extend the 
concept to cover representations that are not obviously spatial. These projects, seen in 
the light of historical developments in the theory of spatial memory and cognitive 
structure, reveal both the ambitions and limitations of research into general-purpose 
representations.
References
Aronov, D., Nevers, R., & Tank, D. W. (2017). Mapping of a non-spatial dimension by 
the hippocampal-entorhinal circuit. Nature, 543, 719-722. 
Aronowitz, S. (2018). Memory is a modeling system. Mind & Language. 
doi:10.1111/mila.12220
Baldassano, C., Hasson, U., & Norman, K. A. (2018). Representation of real-world event
schemas during narrative perception. Journal of Neuroscience, 38(45), 9689-9699.
Behrens, T. E., Muller, T. H., Whittington, J. C., Mark, S., Baram, A. B., Stachenfeld, 
K. L., & Kurth-Nelson, Z. (2018). What is a cognitive map? Organizing knowledge
for flexible behavior. Neuron, 100(2), 490-509.
Bellmund, J. L. S., Gardenfors, P., Moser, E. I., & Doeller, C. F. (2018). Navigating 
24
cognition: spatial codes for human thinking. Science, 362.  
Bermudez, J. L. (1998). The Paradox of Self Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Bermudez, J. L. (2014). Cognitive Science: An Introduction to the Science of the Mind, 
2nd edition. Cambridge University Press.  
Camp, E. (2007). Thinking With Maps*. Philosophical Perspectives, 21(1), 145-182. 
doi:10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00124.x
Camp, E. (2018). Why Maps are Not Propositional. Oxford Scholarship Online. 
doi:10.1093/oso/9780198732570.003.0002
Carruthers, P. (2008). Meta‐cognition in animals: a skeptical look. Mind & Language, 
23(1), 58-89.
Clark, R. E., & Squire, L. R. (2013). Similarity in form and function of the 
hippocampus in rodents, monkeys, and humans. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 110(Supplement 2), 10365-10370.
Collins, A. M., & Loftus, E. F. (1975). A spreading-activation theory of semantic 
processing. Psychological Review, 82(6), 407-428. doi:10.1037/0033-295x.82.6.407
Constantinescu, A. O., O’Reilly, J. X., & Behrens, T. E. (2016). Organizing conceptual 
knowledge in humans with a gridlike code. Science, 352(6292), 1464-1468.
Craver, C. F. (2007). Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of 
25
Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. 
Dabaghian, Y., Brandt, V. L., & Frank, L. M. (2014). Reconceiving the hippocampal 
map as a topological template. eLife, 3, e03476. doi:10.7554/eLife.03476
Doeller, C. F., Barry, C., & Burgess, N. (2010). Evidence for grid cells in a human 
memory network. Nature, 463(7281), 657.
Dresler, M., Shirer, W. R., Konrad, B. N., Müller, N. C., Wagner, I. C., Fernández, 
G., ... & Greicius, M. D. (2017). Mnemonic training reshapes brain networks to 
support superior memory. Neuron, 93(5), 1227-1235.
Ericsson, K. A. (2003). Exceptional memorizers: made, not born. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 7, 233-235.
Glymour, C. N. (2001). The mind's arrows: Bayes nets and graphical causal models in 
psychology. MIT Press.
Goldberg, A. E. (2019). Explain me this: Creativity, competition, and the partial 
productivity of constructions. Princeton University Press.
Gopnik, A., Glymour, C., Sobel, D. M., Schulz, L. E., Kushnir, T., & Danks, D. (2004). 
A theory of causal learning in children: causal maps and Bayes nets. Psychological
review, 111(1), 3
Gulliver, F. P. (1908). Orientation of Maps. Bulletin of the American Geographical 
Society, 40(9), 538. doi:10.2307/198344
26
Hafting, T., Fyhn, M., Molden, S., Moser, M., & Moser, E. I. (2005, 06). Microstructure
of a spatial map in the entorhinal cortex. Nature, 436(7052), 801-806. 
doi:10.1038/nature03721
Hasselmo, M. E. (2008). Grid cell mechanisms and function: contributions of entorhinal 
persistent spiking and phase resetting. Hippocampus, 18(12), 1213-1229.
Hasselmo, M. E. (2011). How we remember: brain mechanisms of episodic memory. 
MIT press.
Høydal, Ø A., Skytøen, E. R., Moser, M., & Moser, E. I. (2018, 03). Object-vector 
coding in the medial entorhinal cortex. doi:10.1101/286286
Kerr, N. H., & Neisser, U. (1983). Mental images of concealed objects: New evidence. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 9(2), 212.
Kuipers, B. (1982). The" map in the head" metaphor. Environment and Behavior, 14(2),
202-220.
Kuipers, B. (2007). An intellectual history of the spatial semantic hierarchy. In Robotics
and cognitive approaches to spatial mapping (pp. 243-264). Springer, Berlin, 
Heidelberg.
Lombrozo, T. (2007, 11). Simplicity and probability in causal explanation. Cognitive 
Psychology, 55(3), 232-257. doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2006.09.006
MacDonald, C. J., Lepage, K. Q., Eden, U. T., & Eichenbaum, H. (2011). Hippocampal 
27
“time cells” bridge the gap in memory for discontiguous events. Neuron, 71, 737-
749. 
Maguire, E. A., Frackowiak, R. S., & Frith, C. D. (1997, 09). Recalling Routes around 
London: Activation of the Right Hippocampus in Taxi Drivers. The Journal of 
Neuroscience, 17(18), 7103-7110. doi:10.1523/jneurosci.17-18-07103.1997
Maguire, E. A., Valentine, E. R., Wilding, J. M., & Kapur, N. (2003). Routes to 
remembering: the brains behind superior memory. Nature Neuroscience, 6, 90-95. 
Mathis, A., Stemmler, M. B., & Herz, A. V. (2015). Probable nature of higher-
dimensional symmetries underlying mammalian grid-cell activity patterns. Elife, 4,
e05979.
Minchin, E. (2001). Homer and the resources of memory: some applications of cognitive
theory to the Iliad and the Odyssey (p. x). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O'Keefe, J., & Nadel, L. (1978). The hippocampus as a cognitive map. Clarendon.
O'Keefe, J., & Dostrovsky, J. (1971, 11). The hippocampus as a spatial map. 
Preliminary evidence from unit activity in the freely-moving rat. Brain Research, 
34(1), 171-175. doi:10.1016/0006-8993(71)90358-1
Raz, A., Packard, M. G., Alexander, G. M., Buhle, J. T., Zhu, H., Yu, S., et al. (2009). 
A slice of pi: an exploratory neuroimaging study of digit encoding and retrieval in 
a superior memorist. Neurocase, 15, 361-372. 
28
Rescorla, M. (2009). Cognitive maps and the language of thought. British Journal for 
the Philosophy of Science, 60, 377-407.
Rescorla, M. (2017). Maps in the head? In K. Andrews and J. Beck (eds.) Routledge 
Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds, Routledge, pp. 34-45. 
Roediger, H. L. (1980). Memory metaphors in cognitive psychology. Memory & 
Cognition, 8(3), 231-246.
Solstad, T., Boccara, C. N., Kropff, E., Moser, M., & Moser, E. I. (2008, 12). 
Representation of Geometric Borders in the Entorhinal Cortex. Science, 
322(5909), 1865-1868. doi:10.1126/science.1166466
Stensola, T., Stensola, H., Moser, M. B., & Moser, E. I. (2015). Shearing-induced 
asymmetry in entorhinal grid cells. Nature, 518(7538), 20
Taube, J. S., Muller, R. U., & Rank, J. B. (1990). Head-direction cells recorded from 
the postsubiculum in freely moving rats. Journal of Neuroscience, 10, 420-435.
Tavares, R. M., Mendelsohn, A., Grossman, Y., Williams, C. H., Shapiro, M., Trope, 
Y., & Schiller, D. (2015). A map for social navigation in the human brain. Neuron,
87(1), 231-243.
Tolman, E. C. (1948). Cognitive maps in rats and men. Psychological Review, 55(4), 
189-208. doi:10.1037/h0061626
Wang, A. Y., & Thomas, M. H. (2000). Looking for long-term mnemonic effects on 
29
serial recall: the legacy of Simonides. American Journal of Psychology, 113, 331-
340. 
Wiener, S. I., & Taube, J. S. (2005). Head direction cells and the neural mechanisms of 
spatial orientation. MIT Press.
Wilding, J. M., & Valentine, E. R. (1997). Superior memory. Psychology Press.
Wood, E. R., Dudchenko, P. A., & Eichenbaum, H. (1999). The global record of 
memory in hippocampal neuronal activity. Nature, 397, 613-616. 
Yoon, J. S., Ericsson, K. A., Donatelli, D. (2018). Effects of 30 years of disuse on 
exceptional memory performance. Cognitive Science, 42, 884-903. 
Zhao, M. (2018). Human spatial representation: what we cannot learn from studies of 
rodent navigation. Journal of Neurophysiology, 120, 2453-2465.
30
